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Abstract: This paper discusses a new group of parties that we term anti-establishment reform 
parties (AERPs), which combine moderate social and economic policies with anti-establishment 
appeals and a desire to change the way politics is conducted. We analyse the electoral 
breakthroughs of AERPs in Eastern Europe (CEE), the region where AERPs have so been most 
successful.  Examples include the Simeon II National Movement, GERB (Bulgaria), Res Publica 
(Estonia), New Era (Latvia), TOP09 and Public Affairs (Czech Republic) and Positive Slovenia. 
We examine the conditions under which such parties broke through in nine CEE states in 1997-
2012 using Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA).  We find five sufficient causal 
paths combining high or rising corruption, rising unemployment and party system instability. 
Rising corruption plays a key role in most pathways but, unexpectedly, AERP breakthroughs are 
more closely associated with economic good times than bad. 
 
Mobilization against Europe’s political establishments is on the rise. This has naturally 
focused the attention of scholars and policy-makers on the emergence of protest parties and 
movements. Much discussion has centred on the electoral successes and prospects of populist 
radical right parties such as Hungary’s Jobbik or the True Finns or groupings on the radical 
left like SYRIZA in Greece (Jordan 2010, Wolin 2011). Fears of a radical populist electoral 
backslash have been especially marked in relation to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), 
whose weaker economies and less consolidated democracies appear fertile ground for radical-
right and illiberal populist parties after the falling away of EU accession conditionalities 
(Rupnik 2007, Bohle & Greskovits 2009). 
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However, alongside conventional radical populists a major new protest phenomenon has 
appeared which so far has been relatively under-researched: successful new parties, which 
combine mainstream ideology on economic and socio-cultural issues with fierce anti-
establishment rhetoric and demands for political reform, transparency and new ways of ‘doing 
politics’. Such parties matter politically. They can achieve overnight electoral breakthroughs 
on a scale sufficient to restructure party systems and unlike radical populist groupings,   even 
when they do not, often have high coalition potential. Such protest-oriented parties may pose 
a challenge for democracy, Despite their success, they often struggle to govern and can 
rapidly break up, sometimes preparing the ground for new protest parties, potentially feeding 
a spiral of protest and instability (Deegan-Krause 2007, Deegan Krause & Haughton 2009). 
New anti-establishment parties of this kind are increasingly breaking through in established 
democracies, Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement being perhaps the most spectacular 
example. However, they have been a feature across the political landscape of Central and 
Eastern Europe for some years (Mesežnikov, Gyárfášová & Bútorová 2013). Parties such as 
Simeon II National Movement in Bulgaria founded by the notional heir to the Bulgarian 
throne (Barany 2002) or Res Publica in Estonia (Taagepera 2006) enjoyed electoral landslides 
months after launching in 2001 and 2003 and immediately became leading parties of the 
government. Others, such as Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) in Slovakia (2010) or Public 
Affairs (VV, 2010) and the ANO movement of billionaire Andrej Babiš (2013) in the Czech 
Republic have achieved more modest success, but entered government coalitions. Elsewhere 
in CEE, however, such parties have been conspicuous by their marginality or absence. The 
experience of the CEE thus represents a natural laboratory for the comparative study of such 
parties, which cast an important light on the wider prospects of this emerging type of protest 
party. 
We term such parties anti-establishment reform parties (AERPs) and in this article we analyse 
the conditions under which their electoral breakthroughs occur using fuzzy-set Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). We first discuss our conceptualisation of the anti-
establishment reform party, briefly relating it to existing concepts such as populism, and 
discuss parties in CEE that we classify as AERPs. We then present the fsQCA method and 
briefly review its use in analysing the comparative success of emergent parties across 
different national and electoral contexts. We then consider a range of causal conditions 
relevant to AERPs’ success including economic crisis, corruption and party system instability 
and, using fsQCA, pick out those configurations leading to AERP breakthrough. Contrary to 
our initial expectations we find that breakthroughs can occur during either good or bad 
economic times and that it is rising perceived corruption which is common to many economic 
and political contexts leading to AERP breakthrough.  
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Anti-establishment reform parties 
As Deegan-Krause (2010) observes, despite much diversity, there are clear commonalities 
between many new parties that have broken through in recent elections in CEE making them:  
… not exactly a new party family (though in their cultural liberalism and anti-
corruption emphases they share significant elements) and not exactly a new party 
type … but with strong and intersecting elements of both.  
How can this phenomenon be conceptualised? Authors who have noticed the phenomenon 
have often viewed such parties as a sub-type of populism, speaking of ‘new/centrist populism’ 
(Pop-Eleches 2010), ‘centrist populism’ (Učeň et al 2005; Učeň 2007).  Others seen them 
more narrowly as based on a distinct issue dimension: Bågenholm (2013a) for example, terms 
them ‘anti-corruption parties’.  
We conceptualize these parties somewhat differently as anti-establishment reform parties 
which exhibit – to different extents – three core features: (1) a politics of mainstream 
reformism (2) usually framed in terms of anti-establishment appeal to voters; and (3) genuine 
organizational newness.  
By mainstream reformism we understand: firstly, that these parties are committed to 
mainstream models of liberal democracy and the market economy and display neither the 
populist radical right’s inclination to ‘illiberal democracy’, ethnocentrism and social 
conservatism (Mudde 2007) nor the anti-capitalism of the radical left (March & Mudde 2005). 
Secondly, AERPs display a strong commitment to political reform, seeking to reform political 
institutions or change the way politics is conducted. Thus depending on context, they may 
make appeals to fight corruption; replace corrupt or inefficient elites; create new democratic 
structures; or simply offer novelty of political style – a ‘project of newness’ as Sikk (2012) 
terms it.  
Following Abedi (2004: 12) we further understand AERPs as anti-establishment parties: 
parties which present themselves as challengers to establishment parties and emphasize the 
divide between society and the political establishment.  
The third element of our definition is that organizationally AERPs are ‘genuinely new’. Here 
we apply, in slightly extended form of Sikk’s (2005: 399) definition of new parties as those 
that are ‘not successor to any previous parliamentary parties, have a novel name and structure, 
and do not have any important figures from past democratic politics among their major 
members’ (Sikk 2005: 399). We thus exclude alliances and mergers between established 
parties and parties resulting from breakaways from established parties.
 1
 
 
4 
Our stress on anti-establishment stance of AERPs overlaps with the widely used concept of 
‘populism’. However, for a number of reasons we avoid this label. Even when clearly and 
minimally defined (see Mudde 2004:542) the concept tends conflate anti-establishment appeal 
with a set of moralistic anti-political appeals. While often empirically associated, these are, 
we contend, conceptually distinct and do not logically imply one another, leading to empirical 
miscategorisation. Although often labelled ‘populist’, few AERPs make the strongly 
moralistic distinctions between the political elite and the pure unsullied People said to be a 
defining characteristic of populist parties. We also take issue with the term’s normative 
connotations (see Sikk 2010 for further discussion).  
We thus use the concept of AERP as a broad working category, whose validity will be tested 
by the search for common causal patterns. To identify AERPs empirically we first identify 
genuinely new parties and eliminate those regarded as radical-right or radical-left in the 
literature (Mudde 2007, March 2011) or whose programmes or declarations clearly identify 
them as such. We then examined party programmes and statements and used case knowledge 
to distinguish those new parties making anti-establishment reformist appeals from other new 
parties. We thus excluded a number of new partiers, including radical right groupings (League 
of Polish Families 2001, Ataka, Bulgaria 2005 and Jobbik, Hungary 2010) and Green parties 
(Estonia 2007, Czech Republic 2006). 
Strikingly, however, the large majority of successful genuinely new parties in CEE have been 
AERPs with only a minority of successful new parties in the region emerging on the radical 
right. Although potentially limiting leverage for distinguishing the conditions of AERP 
success from those of other types of anti-establishment party, this does this reduce our study 
to a generic study of new parties Although different types of successful new party may share 
some causal drivers, AERPs are a conceptually distinct subset of new parties whose success is 
encompassed by a distinct range of causal conditions
2
 which we study through a cross-
national, cross-election comparison of distinct pathways. 
We identified 21 successful AERPs in parliamentary elections in CEE between 1994 and 
2012.In all instances, we refer to a party at the time of the parliamentary election in question 
as CEE parties, both new and established, can experience considerable changes in their 
identity and programmatic appeals. 
Our data clearly suggests that AERP breakthrough is largely a phenomenon of the 
approximately the last 15 years. This fits the observations of Pop-Eleches regarding the 
timing of the success of ‘unconventional parties’ in CEE, which he explains in broad 
aggregate terms by the dynamics of ‘third generation’ post-communist elections: having voted 
into office and become disappointed with the performance of conventional parties of left and 
right in successive elections, voters are ready to turn to unconventional new parties (Pop-
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Eleches 2010: 223).  We accept this logic and focus on ‘third generation’ elections to the 
lower houses of CEE parliaments, which took place between September 1997 and December 
2012. We list elections and AERPs covered in Table 1.
3
  
Table 1. Electoral support for AERPs 1997-2012  
Election Successful AERP 
Votes 
% 
Set membership 
 in BREAKTHRU 
BGR 2001 Simenon II Movement (NDSV) 42.7 1.00 
BGR 2005 – 0.0 0.00 
BGR 2009 Movement for the European  
Development of Bulgaria (GERB) 39.7 1.00 
CZE 2002 – 0.0 0.00 
CZE 2006 –  0.0 0.00 
CZE 2010 TOP09, Public Affairs (VV) 27.6 1.00 
EST 1999 – 0.0 0.00 
EST 2003 Res Publica 24.6 0.99 
EST 2007 – 0.0 0.00 
EST 2011 – 0.0 0.00 
HUN 1998 – 0.0 0.00 
HUN 2002 – 0.0 0.00 
HUN 2006 – 0.0 0.00 
HUN 2010 Politics Can Be Different (LMP) 7.5 0.54 
LTU 2000 New Union (SL) 19.6 0.98 
LTU 2004 Labor Party (DP) 28.4 1.00 
LTU 2008 National Resurrection Party (TPP) 15.1 0.92 
LTU 2012 Way of Courage (DK) 9.8 0.70 
LVA 1998 New Party (JP) 7.3 0.53 
LVA 2002 New Era (JL) 24.0 0.99 
LVA 2006 – 0.0 0.00 
LVA 2010 – 0.0 0.00 
LVA 2011 Zatler’s Reform Party (ZRP) 21.3 0.99 
POL 1997 – 0.0 0.00 
POL 2001 Law and Justice (PiS) 9.5 0.68 
POL 2005 – 0.0 0.00 
POL 2007 – 0.0 0.00 
POL 2011 Palikot Movement (RP) 10.5 0.74 
SVK 2002 SMER, Alliance of the New Citizen (ANO) 21.5 0.99 
SVK 2006 – 0.0 0.00 
SVK 2010 Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) 12.2 0.82 
SVK 2012 Ordinary People (OLaNO) 11.4 0.79 
SVN 2008 –  0.0 0.00 
SVN 2011 Positive Slovenia (PS-LZJ),  
Virant List (DLGV) 36.9 1.00 
Source: European Elections Database and websites of national electoral authorities. 
Scores for parties with less than 4% were not used, resulting in formal raw score of 0.0. 
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No AERPs have materialized in Romania which we contend may be related to the markedly 
low level of democratic freedoms in that country compared to other EU states (as indicated by 
Freedom House political rights and press freedom scores). For the sake of analytical clarity 
we therefore exclude this country from our analysis.  
QCA conditions 
For our analysis we use Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), a comparative technique 
which formalizes the logic of qualitative case-based comparison by linking configurations of 
causes (conditions) to effects (outcomes) using Boolean algebra and set theory (Ragin 2008, 
Rihoux & Ragin 2009). QCA is well suited to cross-national comparison of the success levels 
of a group of new parties as it can address both relatively high numbers of cases and high 
levels of casual complexity, capturing common causes, configurations of causes and multiple 
pathways to the same outcome (Redding & Viterna 1999, Veughlers & Magnan 2005, 
Gherghina & Jiglau 2011). 
We use the Fuzzy Set form of QCA (fsQCA) where cases are coded in terms of their degree 
of set membership in outcome and causal conditions, rather than the dichotomous presence or 
absence of conditions and outcomes as in the original Crisp Set version of QCA (csQCA, see 
Ragin 1987). Degrees of membership are expressed as values ranging from 1.0 (full 
membership) to 0.0 (full non-membership) with a ‘crossover value’ of maximum ambiguity 
set at 0.5. Although expressed numerically, the degrees of set membership are anchored in 
researchers’ theoretically-based judgments, with at least three key anchor points (0, 0.5 and 1) 
corresponding to a verbal description.
4
  
Outcome: AERP electoral breakthrough (BREAKTHRU) 
AERPs have considerably greater vote winning potential than the niche or radical parties 
which earlier QCA studies of new party emergence focus on (Redding & Viterna 1999, 
Veughlers & Magnan 2005, Gherghina & Jiglau 2011). In the elections we studied, there were 
two cases – Bulgaria 2001 and 2009 – where a single AERP was supported by more than a 
third of the electorate and one (Slovenia 2011) where the combined vote for AERPs was 
above this level. We set the threshold for full membership in the set BREAKTHRU at a level 
of massive electoral support (30 per cent of votes or more)
 
when the AERP becomes the first 
or second biggest party and hence a major party in a coalition government or a major 
opposition party.
5 We set the crossover point (0.5 set membership) at 7 per cent of the vote, 
which is safely sufficient to win parliamentary representation and to gain a share of seats 
roughly proportional to the party’s vote share, with the AERP becoming a minor governing or 
opposition party. We deem any election where there is no AERP vote to be fully out of the set 
(0).
6
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Causal conditions 
Previous cross-national QCA studies of the comparative success of Green, far-right and ethnic 
parties (Redding & Viterna 1999, Veugelers & Magnan 2005, Gherghina & Jiglau 2011) have 
drawn on ready-made propositions about causes of their success from a large existing 
literature. For an emerging group of parties such as AERPs, we necessarily draw on a more 
diverse range of literature: the limited work on AERP-type parties (Učeň et al 2005, Sikk 
2012, Bågenholm 2013a); our own case knowledge of CEE; the comparative literatures on 
new parties, populism, voting behaviour and democratic quality; and recent commentary by 
academic writers. 
Crisis and economic hard time. Many commentators have seen the recent rise of anti-
establishment parties across Europe as a response to the pressures exerted by the global 
economic downturn and the Eurozone crisis (Bartels 2013, Cramme 2013, Van Biezen & 
Wallace 2013: 294-7). Such expectations echo the political science literature which sees the 
inability of established actors to deliver reasonable economic conditions as a potential driver 
of protest voting for new parties. Such patterns of anti-incumbent economic voting generally 
are, moreover, sharper and more prevalent in CEE (Roberts 2009). 
The global economic downturn that started in 2008-9 affected all CEE states following a 
period of economic expansion across the region. However, the downturn affected CEE states 
to markedly different degrees and built on pre-recession economies which also varied, 
particularly in terms of unemployment, reflecting different national trajectories of post-
communist reform.  
We therefore look at two economic conditions expected to enhance the chances of AERP 
breakthrough: economic contraction (NOGRO) and rising unemployment (INCUNEMP). 
Economic contraction (NOGRO) has both direct effects on consumption and levels of public 
provision and broader socio-political effects in stoking public discontent with incumbents. 
Extreme levels of economic contraction also create a sense of social crisis which may prompt 
voters to look for political alternatives. 
To operationalise economic contraction (NOGRO), we set the threshold for full set 
membership at a 5 per cent decline in a country’s GDP. The minimum threshold (‘fully out’) 
is set at a very high level of economic growth of 5 per cent, a phenomenon empirically 
observed in CEE states at various points since 1989. We set the cross-over point at 0 per cent 
annual change in GDP, corresponding to a stagnant economy.  
We look at the average level of economic growth over two previous years, as the effects of 
growth might become visible with a slight delay. Likewise, we expect that a period of 
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economic downturn, especially if marked, may have socio-psychological impact felt even 
after the economy has subsequently picked up.  
A second consequence of economic downturn is increasing unemployment. This directly and 
immediately impacts those made redundant and their families, but arguably also affects wider 
groups of voters who fear for their own job security.
7
 Even at relatively low levels, sharply 
increasing unemployment represents a favourable condition for a turn to non-establishment 
politics and AERP breakthrough. Hence, we incorporate a condition of sharply increasing 
unemployment (INCUNEMP) which we operationalise as the change in unemployment rates 
over the two years before the election. We set the maximum threshold corresponding to full 
membership in the set at an increase of 3 percentage points and the lower threshold (‘fully out 
of set’) at a 3 percentage point decrease in unemployment levels. The crossover point is set at 
a near zero decrease of 0.5 percentage points.
8
  
These two economic conditions define four distinct socio-economic conjunctures 
characteristic of different countries and time periods: economic recession where GDP is 
falling and unemployment increasing (NOGRO*UNUNEMP); economic boom where GDP is 
increasing and unemployment falling (~NOGRO*~INUNEMP); restructuring or reform 
where the economy is growing but shedding jobs (~NOGRO*INCUNEMP); and recession 
with a social safety valve where unemployment falls despite economic contraction 
(NOGRO*~INCUNEMPs) spurred by mass withdrawal from the labour market due to 
emigration or policies promoting early retirement.  
Perceived corruption and distrust. In contrast to explanations which foreground economic 
recession and growth in unemployment, some authors have interpreted the rise of anti-
establishment parties as a crisis of confidence in conventional democratic politics and the 
honesty and competence of elites (Kaldor & Selchow 2013, Žižek 2013). Perceived 
corruption and the politicization of corruption have often been linked to the rise of AERP-like 
parties (Deegan-Krause 2010, Bågenholm 2013a) and, more broadly, to anti-incumbent voting 
(Slomczynski & Shabad 2012, Bågenholm 2013b). Such anti-corruption sentiment may be 
understood both in terms of direct concern about corruption and an inchoate sense that 
political elites are self-serving, untrustworthy and unrepresentative. However, other writers 
(Blass, Roberts & Shaw 2012, Hooghe & Quintelier 2014) associate high levels of perceived 
corruption with demobilisation and non-participation benefiting established politicians.  
For this reason we distinguish two corruption-related conditions: a social perception of high 
corruption (HICORR) and a substantial increase in perceived levels of corruption 
(INCORR). For the purposes of QCA analysis we initially assume both to have a positive 
effect on AERP breakthrough.  
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To operationalise levels of perceived corruption we use Transparency International’s annual 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI). Although CPI is often criticized as poorly reflecting ‘real’ 
levels of corruption, it is arguably a meaningful measure of the type of public concerns we 
wish to highlight.
9
 We place an election fully in the set of high levels of perceived corruption 
(HICORR) if the CPI score for the election year
10
 falls below 3.5, around the worst 
empirically achieved levels in CEE after 1999 (Romania and Bulgaria). A case is fully out of 
this set if CPI reaches 5.5 – a benchmark level based on the lowest levels of perceived 
corruption in the region after this date (achieved only by Slovenia and Estonia). The crossover 
point of maximum ambiguity (0.5) is 4.6, a figure close to the median corruption rating in 
CEE across the period.  
We deem a case to be fully in the set of elections where there has been a substantial increase 
in the level of perceived corruption (INCCORR) if the CPI score decreases by 0.4 points, 
indicating a substantial deterioration in corruption. A case is fully out of the condition if a 
country’s CPI score increases by 0.4 points over the preceding two years – that is there is 
substantial improvement.
11
 We set the cross-over point at a decrease in the CPI score of just 
over zero (0.01), a point where there is neither improvement nor deterioration.
12
 
Political conditions. In earlier iterations of this work (Hanley & Sikk 2011) we included 
several conditions relating to the party-electoral context, including the presence of strong 
radical (right) populist parties and electoral turnout. However, these lacked explanatory 
power. With increased turnout, it was difficult satisfactorily to distinguish cause and effect, 
while most electorally significant radical parties in CEE were, on closer inspection, relatively 
niche groupings without insufficiently broad appeal to compete with AERPs.  
In this paper we retain just one such condition: previous levels of voting for genuinely new 
parties (HGENP). CEE parties and party systems are weakly institutionalised compared to 
other regions. However, there have been uneven patterns of party system stability within the 
region (Powell & Tucker 2014) which may influence AERP breakthrough. We hypothesise 
that a history of support for genuinely new parties reflects the presence of a significant pool of 
‘available’ voters, who may perceive an emerging AERP as a credible challenger. 
To operationalize this condition we took the maximum support for genuinely new parties in 
the previous two elections. A case is a full member of this condition (set membership 1.0) if 
combined support for genuinely new parties was 30 per cent or more – enough to generate 
one new major party or a number of minor breakthroughs. A case was fully out of this set if 
no genuinely new party won votes over this period. The crossover point was set at 19 per cent, 
equating to substantial support for one genuinely new party or more modest support for a 
range of less successful new parties.
13
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Empirical analysis 
We used the QCA module in R (Dusa & Thiem 2012), to analyse BREAKTHRU in relation 
to these five socio-political conditions. As expected we found that there was no single 
necessary condition for AERP breakthrough. This confirms that AERP breakthroughs cannot 
be accounted for by encompassing narratives often used to frame them: popular reactions to 
economic hard times or a crisis of party systems and party government. The two single 
conditions which came closest to being necessary were rising corruption (INCORR) and 
rising unemployment (INCUNEMP). However, their consistency scores of 0.721 and 0.622 
respectively placed them far below what is required for causal necessity.
14
 One combination 
of two conditions (HICORR + INCORR) had high enough consistency (0.91) to be regarded 
as a necessary condition. This states that AERP breakthrough required either rising corruption 
or an already high level of corruption. However, its coverage of cases (0.58) was relatively 
low. This suggests that accounts which stress the bubbling up of anti-political, anti-corruption 
sentiments may come closer to general explanation but are far from sufficient.  
Seeking sufficient paths to AERP breakthrough.  
To find sufficient causal paths we generated a ‘truth table’ which shows the consistency of the 
32 possible combinations of conditions relative to AERPs breakthrough (see Appendix
15
). 
Individual elections are listed in the rows (causal combinations) with which they are most 
consistent. Rows of logically possible counterfactual combinations of conditions with no 
matching real life case (‘logic remainders’) are also shown. To determine which causal 
configurations should be classified as leading to BREAKTHRU we set a consistency cut-off 
at 0.78 This is slightly below the widely used cut-off of 0.8, but comfortably above the 0.75 
minimum recommended in the literature (Rihoux & Ragin 2008: 87-112, Schneider & 
Wagemann 2012: 279) and reflects a natural gap in the distribution. 
In line with normal fsQCA practice we first examined the conservative (complex) solution 
produced using only empirically-occurring cases. The conservative solution had a high level 
of consistency (0.85) and relatively broad coverage (0.79 and identified five relatively 
complex sufficient causal paths for AERP breakthrough. We then simplified our solution by 
incorporating counter-factual cases. We formulated a parsimonious solution including all such 
counterfactual ‘logical remainders’ and an intermediate solution incorporating only ‘good 
counterfactuals’ (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 168-175,199) offering a middle way between 
parsimony and empirical complexity.
16
  
 
11 
The ‘easy’ or ‘good’ counterfactuals used in the intermediate solution require clearly stated, 
theoretically or empirically based assumptions about ‘directionality’: the directional effects 
that conditions would have in the counter-factual cases. QCA studies focusing on testing 
existing theory typically derive these off-the-shelf from large mature literatures. However, for 
a theory-building undertaking such as the comparative analysis of a new emerging group of 
parties, where the literature was inevitably more limited, we proceeded more cautiously.  
In setting directional assumption, we drew on the limited published work on AERPs (largely 
single country case studies); our own case knowledge of the region; insights that can be 
gleaned from related literatures on new parties or populism; and careful consideration of 
patterns produced by the initial conservative solution. Reviewing our conditions, we 
concluded that four could plausibly be interpreted as contributing to AERP breakthroughs in 
either positive or negative form depending on the wider configuration of causes. Thus, while 
unstable party systems (HGENP) might (as widely argued in the literature) provide 
opportunities for new populist-type parties, stable party systems (~HGENP) could do the 
same in some contexts if they had become rigid, unresponsive or oligarchical (Kaltwasser 
2012).  
Rising unemployment and economic contraction might, as initially anticipated, drive electoral 
discontent with establishment parties. However, examining key cases in the conservative 
solution (Estonia 2003, Lithuania 2004, Lithuania 2008) we judged that in some contexts 
falling unemployment and a buoyant economy might provide a cue for some voters to turn 
away from economic issues and focus on questions of corruption and governance – opening 
up opportunities for AERPs.  
As already noted, high corruption can favour new anti-establishment parties in many contexts 
and demobilise in others. Conversely, we concluded, there might also be contexts where low 
perceived corruption could also plausibly create circumstances favourable to AERP 
breakthrough. Low but rapidly increasing corruption (INCCORR *~HICORR) which appears 
in two of our paths (2, 4) might have an especially shocking and mobilising effect. We 
therefore set a directional expectation only for rising corruption (INCORR), which theoretical 
and empirical evidence consistently pointed to as favouring AERP breakthrough. 
The intermediate solution (see Table 2) enabled us to identify five distinct contexts favourable 
to AERP breakthrough. 
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Table 2: Intermediate solution (BREAKTHRU) 
 
  Consistency PRI Coverage 
Unique 
coverage Cases 
1 ~NOGRO*INCUNEMP* 
HICORR 
0.905 0.890 0.370 0.204 BGR01, BGR09, 
LTU00, POL01,  
SVK02, SVK10,  
SVK12 
2 ~NOGRO*INCCORR* 
HGENP 
0.841 0.810 0.351 0.105 BGR09,LTU04,  
LTU08, LTU12, 
LVA02, SVK10,  
SVK12  
3 ~NOGRO*~INCUNEMP* 
~HICORR*INCCORR 
0.889 0.870 0.157 0.053 EST03, LTU04, 
LTU12  
4 NOGRO*INCUNEMP* 
INCCORR*~HGENP 
0.831 0.793 0.150 0.132 CZE10, HUN10,  
SVN11  
5 NOGRO*HICORR* 
INCCORR*~HGENP 
0.985 0.984 0.073 0.056 LVA11  
Consistency: 0.85, Coverage: 0.81  
Path 1: Corrupt socially painful growth (~NOGRO*INCUNEMP*HICORR). This scenario 
combines rising unemployment (INCUNEMP) with economic growth (~NOGRO) and a 
background of high perceived corruption (HICORR). This corresponds to a context of 
apparently successful economic reform or restructuring, whose costs and benefits are, 
nevertheless, seen as unjustly distributed because of unemployment and high levels of 
perceived corruption. This experience was largely characteristic of a phase of post-communist 
reform in some CEE states shortly before EU accession in 2000-2 (Lithuania 2000, Poland 
2001, Slovakia 2002) as well as of Slovakia in 2010 and 2012 as it recovered from the 2008-9 
recession.  
Path 2: Growth but increasing corruption in an unstable party system 
(~NOGRO*INCCORR*HGENP). This path, which covers Lithuania (2004-2012), Latvia 
2002), Slovakia (2010, 2012) and Bulgaria (2009) shows economic growth (~NOGRO) 
coupled with increasing corruption (INCCORR) in an unstable party system (HGENP) 
favouring AERP breakthrough. The configuration suggests that even where the economy is 
growing, when corruption is increasing voters will turn to AERPs in large numbers if there is 
already a tradition of voting for new parties.  
Path 3: Low and rising corruption in economic good times 
(~NOGRO*~INCUNEMP*~HICORR*INCCORR). Path 3 covers three Baltic elections 
(Estonia 2003, Lithuania 2004, Lithuania 2012) and like path 1 highlights how corruption can 
interact with a seemingly benign socio-economic climate. In these cases a favourable context 
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for AERP breakthrough is created by low but rising corruption (~HICORR*INCCORR) and a 
buoyant economy with both growth and falling unemployment (~NOGRO*~INCUNEMP). 
Increases in perceived corruption in a relatively low corruption environment we suggest have 
a galvanising effect, while improvement in the economy allows voters to refocus on issues of 
corruption and governance. 
Path 4: Recession and rising corruption in rigid party systems 
(NOGRO*INCUNEMP*INCCORR*~HGENP). Path 4 is distinct sub-regional path featuring 
only elections in three recession-hit Visegrád states with previously stable party systems – 
Hungary in 2010, the Czech Republic in 2010 and Slovenia in 2011. These had been generally 
resistant to AERP breakthroughs until the first elections after the 2008-9 downturn. At this 
point, a configuration of recession (NOGRO*INCUNEMP), rising perceived corruption 
(INCCORR) and the previous stability of the established party system (~HGENP) combined 
to create favourable conditions for AERP breakthrough. In all three cases the inability of 
(some or all) established parties credibly to respond to economic crisis and their loss of 
legitimacy because of growing concerns over corruption prepared the ground for AERP 
breakthrough. Strikingly, in this configuration party stability rather than party system fluidity 
contributes to AERP breakthrough: long established parties appeared ossified, corrupt, out-of-
touch and an obstacle to both the solution of urgent socio-economic problems and longer term 
modernisation (Batory 2010, Haughton, Novotná & Deegan-Krause 2011, Haughton & 
Krašovec 2011). 
Path 5: Latvia’s way? (NOGRO*HICORR*INCCORR*~HGENP). The breakthrough of the 
Zatlers Reform Party in Latvia’s 2011 election appears as a unique case represented by its 
own a causal path, albeit in some ways one close to the recession and rising corruption in 
rigid party systems path experienced in Visegrád states (path I4). Here too economic 
contraction (NOGRO) combined with an increasingly stable, but oligarchical party 
establishment. However, the economic context was characterised by economic contraction 
without rising unemployment because of an unusually sharp and deep recession and high 
levels of emigration. Latvia’s path to AERP breakthrough is also characterised by high and 
increasing perceived corruption (HICORR*INCORR), rather than merely increasing 
corruption as in path 4. 
Uncovered cases 
There were a small number of unexplained cases not covered by any of the five paths or 
covered only inconsistently. In the second group we find a few cases of AERP breakthrough 
(lower half of the top right quadrant of Figure 1), which were more limited in scope than the 
highly favourable conditions would imply: Poland 2001, Hungary 2010, Slovakia 2012 and 
Lithuania 2012. As these are members of three different causal pathways they require follow-
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up in post-QCA case comparison (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 305-310). However, both in 
Poland 2001 and Hungary 2010 dynamic new, social populist and/or radical right parties 
appeared that differed in style, appeal and organisation from the niche radical right groups 
found in most CEE countries. Two cases of AERP breakthrough were wholly unexplained by 
our solution set, the most prominent being the success of the Palikot Movement (RP) in 
Poland’s 2011 election, when growing unemployment, economic growth and low and falling 
corruption (INCUNEMP*~HICORR*~INCCORR*~HGENP) should have relegated it to 
marginality.
17  
Figure 1 
 
 
Concluding discussion 
This study provides a set of explanations for the anti-establishment reform parties’ electoral 
breakthroughs in ‘third generation’ elections in CEE since 1997. Our intermediate solution 
has high levels of overall consistency (0.85) and coverage (0.81) picks out distinct paths 
which can be interpreted in ways which plausibly fit case knowledge. This suggests that the 
group of parties we term AERPs does have a degree of coherence and should be regarded as 
more than a ragbag, residual category of otherwise hard-to-label protest parties.  
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At the same time our work underlines that early debates (implicitly) framing the rise of such 
new anti-establishment parties as a reflection either of a crisis of (dysfunctional/corrupt) 
democratic governance or the impact of recession and economic hard times are misplaced. 
Instead, our findings suggest, research needs to focus on the ways in which economic 
conditions, corruption and patterns of party (in)stability interact to facilitate the breakthrough 
of these parties. In this respect our five sufficient causal paths offer a number of intriguing – 
and sometimes counterintuitive – findings. 
Corruption vs. economics 
One pattern is immediately striking: contrary to the view of AERPs as ‘crisis parties’ they are 
often not products of economic contraction. Three of the five paths to AERP breakthrough 
covering 12 cases (combined unique coverage 0.362) take place in a context of economic 
growth. Conversely, paths 4 and 5 which feature elections taking place against a backdrop of 
economic contraction cover only four cases (combined unique coverage 0.188). This suggests 
that rather than damping down anti-political moods, economic good times can give voters 
space to consider governance issues. 
However, the presence of rising corruption (INCORR) in four of the five sufficient paths and 
the necessity of one corruption-related condition (HICORR + INCORR) suggests a still more 
different story. This is best seen in the re-presentation of the intermediate solution in Figure 2 
which highlights the role of rising corruption as the most common driver of AERP 
breakthrough, albeit one refracted through sets of economic and party-political circumstances.  
Figure 2 
 
The importance of INCORR lends qualified support to perspectives stressing the importance 
of governance structures and citizen-politician relationships, although it also sharply poses the 
question of how and when they matter. 
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Spirals of instability?  
Our use of individual elections as cases allows us not only to compare across contexts, but 
also to look for temporal patterns. We can thus assess the proposition that some CEE party 
systems will experience repeated cyclical breakthroughs by new anti-establishment parties 
campaigning on anti-corruption issues (Deegan-Krause 2007; Deegan Krause & Haughton 
2009). We find qualified confirmation for this thesis. The pattern appears clearly in the case 
of Lithuania, which experienced AERP breakthroughs in every ‘third generation’ election in 
our sample. Latvia (1998, 2002), Slovakia (2010, 2012) and Bulgaria (2001 and 2009) which 
had close AERP breakthroughs. However, there is limited evidence of any process of 
‘increasing returns’ of the type envisaged by Deegan-Krause (2007). There were two major 
linked breakthroughs in Bulgaria: the Simeon II Movement, which disrupted the established 
party system by breaking through in 2001 (and subsequently declined) did arguably prepare 
the ground for GERB in 2009. However, repeated breakthroughs in Lithuania and Slovakia 
did not become greater over time, suggesting that cyclical processes may be relatively weak 
or can be damped down by other factors.  
Our solution also offers insights into the sequencing of the paths involved in repeated AERP 
breakthroughs. Most instances of multiple breakthroughs were covered by paths 1 and 2. 
However, initial breakthroughs in such states (Lithuania 2000, Bulgaria 2001, Poland 2001, 
Slovakia 2002) were covered by only one path: corrupt socially painful growth (path 1). All 
cases covered by path 2 (growth with increasing corruption in an unstable party system) were 
repeat breakthroughs. This suggests that corrupt socially painful growth provides an 
important context for initial AERP breakthrough while rising corruption (regardless of 
changes in unemployment) in an already destabilised stable party system provides a context 
for further episodes. This pattern is especially marked in Lithuania where initial AERP 
breakthrough (the New Union in 2000) was covered only by path 1, while all subsequent 
breakthroughs were found in path 2. 
Party system consolidation – a double-edged sword? 
It is also striking that both party system stability and instability can contribute to AERP 
breakthrough in different economic and social contexts. Party system instability (HGENP) 
contributes to AERP breakthrough in one important causal path (path 3). However, counter-
intuitively, we also find that party system stability (~HGENP) is in many circumstances 
conducive to AERP breakthrough. This runs contrary to much literature on parties and party 
systems in new democracies which assumes that, once established, stability tends to endure by 
triggering processes of institutionalisation (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006). Stable party 
systems in CEE thus appear a somewhat mercurial phenomenon which can ‘tip’ into 
contributing to their own demise: when established parties fail to deliver growth and reduce 
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perceptions of corruption, many voters turn against them as oligarchical ‘dinosaurs’. 
Alternatively it may simply be that established CEE parties’ apparent sustainability was 
driven by repeat electoral success without any real processes of institutionalisation occurring.  
What can stop anti-establishment reform parties? 
Under what circumstances can stable party systems block the emergence of successful 
AERPs? Which causal configurations stymie AERP breakthrough? The absence of AERP 
breakthrough – the so-called negation of the solution (~BREAKTHRU) – corresponds 
empirically to the success of a diverse range of established parties and non-AERP challengers. 
In consequence, the causal paths found in the conservative and intermediate solutions are 
complex.
18
 However, the parsimonious solution (see Table 3) does highlight three paths 
blocking AERP breakthrough, of which two have broad coverage.  
Table 3: Parsimonious solution (~BREAKTHRU) 
  Consistency PRI Coverage Unique 
coverage 
cases  
1 ~HICORR*~INCCORR 0.849 0.840 0.414 0.328 EST99, EST07, 
HUN98,HUN02, 
HUN06,POL97, 
SVN08, POL11  
2 ~INCUNEMP*~INCCORR* 
HGENP 
0.864 0.852 0.266 0.179 BGR05, EST07, 
LVA06, SVK06 
3 NOGRO*HGENP 0.902 0.892 0.121 0.111 EST11; LVA10  
Consistency : 0.86, coverage : 0.71 
 
Path 1 confirms the importance of perceived corruption, suggesting that established parties 
will face no strong AERP challenge where corruption is seen as low and decreasing. The 
second path tells a similar story combining decreasing corruption and unemployment 
(~INCORR* ~INCUNEMP), but also a history of new party success (HGENP). This can be 
interpreted as AERP fatigue as all four cases on path 2 were preceded by the significant 
breakthrough by an AERP which then assumed government office.
19
 The surest strategy for 
established parties in CEE – or for those seeking to rescue its two decades long experiment in 
West European style party politics – is one focussed on countering perceptions of rampant 
and rising corruption.  
The importance of INCORR in AERP breakthroughs (and ~INCORR in non-breakthroughs) 
suggests the phenomenon may be confined to regions with weak and corrupt (or corruptible) 
institutions such as Eastern or Southern Europe with limited potential in core West European 
states. Much, however, depends on whether changes in perceived corruption reflect the ‘real’ 
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performance of institutions and elites. If perceptions of ‘corruption’ merely mask deeper anti-
political resentments we may expect AERPs to become a more widespread phenomenon. 
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Notes 
 
1
 We understand breakaway parties as those where a majority of parliamentary deputies come from a single 
established party. This differs slightly from Sikk (2005: 399) who also excludes ‘participation by prime ministers 
and significant portions of cabinet ministers and members of parliament’. 
2 Similarly, comparative research on CEE radical right parties highlights factors specific to this group (for 
example, the presence of national minorities which lack relevance for the success of other new parties, see 
Bustikova & Kitschelt 2009; Piro 2014). 
3
 We classify Slovakia’s Ordinary People (OL’aNO) as an AERP in 2012, although four OL’aNO 
representatives were elected in 2010 (thanks to preference votes) on another party’s list. The TOP09 party is 
sometimes regarded as a breakaway from the Czech Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL). However, although 
founded by a leading figure in KDU-ČSL, the majority of TOP09 deputies elected in 2010 had no association 
with KDU-ČSL.  
4
 As the raw data for our conditions is continuous, we calculate set memberships following the direct calibration 
technique proposed by Ragin (2008: 85-105). 
5
 Where two AERPs were successful we used their combined vote share for coding.  
6
 Due to data limitations, we only coded support for AERPs in cases where they entered the parliament. 
However, analysis revealed that no AERPs that did not enter the parliament received more than 1 percent of the 
vote.  
7
 We do not include the level of unemployment as a condition. Levels of background unemployment can vary 
significantly between states and, while having undeniable social and political impacts, can quickly become 
‘normalised’. 
8
 We set the cross-over point at a marginal improvement of unemployment situation, as it could be argued that 
unemployment needs to drop by more than 0.5 percentage points to be perceived as improved. 
9
 Data from the Quality of Government dataset. For three elections in 1997 and 1998, change in corruption could 
not be calculated as CPI scores were unavailable. World Bank global governance indicators suggest that Poland 
and Hungary saw substantial reductions in corruption levels (INCCORR = 0.01), while Latvia saw modest 
decline in perceived corruption (0.33). 
10 
Data in CPI reports is usually gathered in the year preceding the headline year. We applied the CPI score for 
the year preceding the headline year. 
11
 CPI changes should not be used to establish trends in actual levels of corruption. However, we believe it is 
acceptable to use them for the broad direction in perceived corruption. In the elections studied, CPI trends 
correspond to other indices such as World Bank Control of Corruption measures. Case knowledge also confirms 
that it is generally a reliable indicator. 
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12 
In a number of cases the CPI score did not change. We thus followed the same logic as with unemployment 
change. We argue that the CPI score needs to decrease slightly before an actual improvement in corruption levels 
is registered among voters. 
13
 The set memberships of all elections in the causal conditions included the analysis are included in Appendix. 
14 
A consistency score of 0.9 – widely seen as minimum level at which a condition can be regarded as necessary 
(Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 330) 
15
 Also available at http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~tjmsasi/. 
16
 We also reviewed these counterfactuals for empirically impossible combinations and ‘contradictory 
simplifying assumptions’ (CSAs). We identified no none of the former and found ‘contradictory assumptions’ 
for which we specified whether they should lead to BREAKTHRU or ~BREAKTHRU (Schneider & Wagemann 
2012: 203-211)  
17
 The success of the Palikot Movement may be attributed to the exceptional strength of secular-religious 
divisions in Poland. 
18
 Conservative and intermediate solutions for ~BREAKTHRU are included in Appendix.  
19
 Res Publica in Estonia (2003), New Era in Latvia (2002), Simeon II Movement in Bulgaria (2001) and the 
Alliance of the New Citizen in Slovakia (2002). The third path economic contraction in an unstable party system 
(NOGRO*HGENP) covers only Latvia in 2010 and Estonia in 2011 and suggests that voters in unstable party 
systems can lose a taste for political novelty in (or shortly after) periods of economic contraction. 
Appendix 
Set memberships for the five conditions and outcome (BREAKTHRU) 
Election NOGRO INCUNEMP HICORR INCCORR HGENP BREAKTHRU 
BGR01 0.005 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.019 1.000 
BGR09 0.000 0.688 1.000 0.999 1.000 1.000 
SVN11 0.990 0.996 0.000 0.996 0.010 1.000 
LTU04 0.000 0.035 0.348 0.875 0.920 0.998 
CZE10 0.726 0.999 0.132 0.996 0.021 0.998 
EST03 0.000 0.035 0.002 0.875 0.038 0.995 
LVA02 0.000 0.201 1.000 0.544 0.666 0.994 
SVK02 0.034 0.644 0.999 0.544 0.048 0.987 
LVA11 1.000 0.035 0.909 1.000 0.005 0.987 
LTU00 0.011 0.995 0.998 0.066 0.258 0.978 
LTU08 0.000 0.799 0.222 0.544 0.997 0.919 
SVK10 0.362 1.000 0.683 0.999 0.999 0.824 
SVK12 0.005 0.549 0.990 1.000 0.996 0.790 
POL11 0.022 0.977 0.012 0.000 0.002 0.739 
LTU12 0.007 0.000 0.222 0.875 0.997 0.699 
POL01 0.002 1.000 0.979 1.000 0.004 0.679 
HUN10 0.983 1.000 0.042 0.976 0.002 0.536 
LVA98 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.330 0.207 0.526 
BGR05 0.000 0.000 0.979 0.180 1.000 0.001 
CZE02 0.006 0.059 0.995 1.000 0.010 0.001 
CZE06 0.000 0.126 0.909 0.001 0.009 0.001 
EST07 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.979 0.001 
EST11 0.999 0.099 0.000 0.875 0.979 0.001 
EST99 0.000 0.966 0.001 0.000 0.038 0.001 
HUN02 0.004 0.431 0.012 0.180 0.014 0.001 
HUN06 0.002 0.977 0.075 0.039 0.007 0.001 
HUN98 0.094 0.012 0.026 0.001 0.014 0.001 
LVA06 0.000 0.001 0.956 0.001 0.993 0.001 
LVA10 1.000 1.000 0.683 0.996 0.993 0.001 
POL05 0.002 0.020 1.000 1.000 0.416 0.001 
POL07 0.001 0.000 0.999 0.039 0.416 0.001 
POL97 0.000 0.012 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001 
SVK06 0.000 0.000 0.909 0.000 0.999 0.001 
SVN08 0.000 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.001 
 
 
 
  
Truth table (outcome: BREAKTHRU) 
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23 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0.989 0.988 LVA11 
16 0 1 1 1 1 1 3 0.982 0.977 BGR09,SVK10,SVK12 
12 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.977 0.968 LTU08 
14 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0.955 0.946  
31 1 1 1 1 0 ? 0 0.940 0.910  
4 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 0.929 0.907 LTU04,LTU12 
13 0 1 1 0 0 1 2 0.917 0.914 BGR01,LTU00 
10 0 1 0 0 1 ? 0 0.865 0.838  
24 1 0 1 1 1 ? 0 0.857 0.663  
29 1 1 1 0 0 ? 0 0.838 0.604  
27 1 1 0 1 0 1 3 0.834 0.798 CZE10,HUN10,SVN11 
3 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0.827 0.822 EST03 
19 1 0 0 1 0 ? 0 0.801 0.741  
15 0 1 1 1 0 1 2 0.798 0.752 POL01,SVK02 
8 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0.781 0.707 LVA02 
30 1 1 1 0 1 ? 0 0.775 0.605  
22 1 0 1 0 1 ? 0 0.762 0.554  
21 1 0 1 0 0 ? 0 0.676 0.421  
11 0 1 0 1 0 ? 0 0.651 0.610  
25 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.622 0.139  
28 1 1 0 1 1 ? 0 0.469 0.288  
5 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0.444 0.325 CZE06,LVA98,POL07 
7 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 0.414 0.320 CZE02,POL05 
32 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.393 0.246 LVA10 
2 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.297 0.187 EST07 
6 0 0 1 0 1 0 3 0.274 0.189 BGR05,LVA06,SVK06 
17 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.252 0.032  
9 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 0.239 0.168 EST99,HUN06,POL11 
26 1 1 0 0 1 ? 0 0.163 0.052  
18 1 0 0 0 1 ? 0 0.146 0.027  
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0.066 0.053 HUN98,HUN02,POL97,SVN08 
20 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0.037 0.004 EST11 
Notes: bold – rows above consistency cut-off (threshold); italics – rows examined because of contradictory 
simplifying assumptions. 
 Truth table (outcome: ~BREAKTHRU) 
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20 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0.996 0.996 EST11 
18 1 0 0 0 1 ? 0 0.976 0.973  
17 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.975 0.968  
26 1 1 0 0 1 ? 0 0.954 0.948  
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 0.947 0.947 HUN98,HUN02,POL97,SVN08 
25 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.939 0.861  
2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.838 0.813 EST07 
6 0 0 1 0 1 1 3 0.831 0.811 BGR05,LVA06,SVK06 
32 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.802 0.754 LVA10 
28 1 1 0 1 1 ? 0 0.786 0.712  
9 0 1 0 0 0 1 3 0.779 0.759 EST99,HUN06,POL11 
21 1 0 1 0 0 ? 0 0.764 0.579  
29 1 1 1 0 0 ? 0 0.752 0.396  
7 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 0.725 0.680 CZE02,POL05 
24 1 0 1 1 1 ? 0 0.718 0.337  
22 1 0 1 0 1 ? 0 0.704 0.446  
5 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0.684 0.617 CZE06,LVA98,POL07 
30 1 1 1 0 1 ? 0 0.655 0.395  
8 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0.471 0.293 LVA02 
11 0 1 0 1 0 ? 0 0.454 0.390  
19 1 0 0 1 0 ? 0 0.429 0.259  
31 1 1 1 1 0 ? 0 0.394 0.090  
12 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.312 0.032 LTU08 
10 0 1 0 0 1 ? 0 0.303 0.162  
4 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 0.263 0.033 LTU04,LTU12 
15 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 0.249 0.074 POL01,SVK02 
16 0 1 1 1 1 0 3 0.227 0.023 BGR09,SVK10,SVK12 
14 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0.211 0.054  
3 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.199 0.178 EST03 
27 1 1 0 1 0 0 3 0.193 0.015 CZE10,HUN10,SVN11 
13 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 0.115 0.086 BGR01,LTU00 
23 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0.059 0.012 LVA11 
Notes: bold – rows above consistency cut-off (threshold); italics – rows examined because of contradictory 
simplifying assumptions. 
 Parsimonious solution (BREAKTHRU) 
  
Consistency PRI Coverage 
Unique 
coverage cases 
1 
~NOGRO*INCCORR* 
HGENP 
0.841 0.810 0.351 0.085 
BGR09 LTU04 LTU08 
LTU12 LVA02 SVK10 
SVK12 
2 NOGRO*INCCORR* 
~HGENP 
0.872 0.851 0.211 0.057 
CZE10, HUN10, LVA11, 
SVN11,  
3 
~NOGRO*INCUNEMP* 
HICORR 
0.905 0.890 0.370 0.203 
BGR01, BGR09, LTU00, 
POL01, SVK02, SVK10, 
SVK12 
4 ~HICORR*INCCORR* 
~HGENP 
0.839 0.815 0.222 0.009 
 CZE10, EST03, HUN10, 
SVN11 
5 ~NOGRO*~HICORR* 
INCCORR 
0.914 0.897 0.219 0.000 
EST03, LTU04, LTU08, 
LTU12 
Consistency: 0.85, Coverage: 0.81  
 
Conservative solution (~BREAKTHRU) 
  
Consistency PRI Coverage 
Unique 
coverage cases 
1 
~NOGRO*~HICORR* 
~INCCORR*~HGENP 
0.867 0.861 0.328 0.320 
HUN98,HUN02, 
POL97,SVN08; 
EST99,HUN06, 
POL11  
2 ~NOGRO*~INCUNEMP* 
~INCCORR*HGENP 
0.861 0.848 0.259 0.250 
EST07; BGR05, 
LVA06,SVK06  
3 NOGRO*~INCUNEMP* 
~HICORR* 
INCCORR*HGENP 
0.996 0.996 0.050 0.048 EST11  
4 NOGRO*INCUNEMP* 
HICORR*INCCORR 
*HGENP 
0.802 0.754 0.050 0.047 LVA10  
Consistency: 0.88, coverage: 0.68 
 
Intermediate solution (~BREAKTHRU) 
  
Consistency PRI Coverage 
Unique 
coverage Cases 
1 
~HICORR* 
~INCCORR*~HGENP 
0.868 0.862 0.334 0.325 
EST99, HUN98,  
HUN02, HUN06, 
POL97, POL11, 
SVN08  
2 NOGRO*HICORR* 
INCCORR*HGENP 
0.803 0.754 0.050 0.047 LVA10  
3 ~NOGRO*~INCUNEMP* 
~INCCORR*HGENP 
0.861 0.848 0.259 0.250 
BGR05, EST07, 
LVA06, SVK06  
4 NOGRO*~INCUNEMP* 
INCCORR*HGENP 
0.974 0.972 0.051 0.047 EST11  
   Consistency: 0.88, Coverage:  0.68 
 
